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New Requirements for a New Challenge: 





Threats along America’s borders have taken on a new and ominous character. In the 
past, United States customs and border officials were focused on relatively benign 
matters of enforcing laws surrounding trade and immigration, protecting agriculture 
and economic interests from pest and disease, and processing people, vehicles and 
cargo.1 In the last three decades, however, these issues have been joined, and eclipsed, 
by growing apprehension surrounding matters of far greater concern than illegal 
immigrants in search of economic opportunities. The migration of gangs across the 
nation’s borders and into our cities, organized criminal elements trafficking drugs and 
human beings into the United States, and the specter of terrorists and terrorist devices 
seeping through our borders to the north and south, all combine to contribute to a 
growing set of dangers to our people. Moreover, a compounded threat is emerging at the 
intersection of these concerns, wherein criminal and terrorist elements may unite 
toward the attainment of shared and separate goals. The combination of these elements 
elevates the potential disruption to our society beyond the responsibilities of law 
enforcement to matters of defense. 
As the nature and severity of the threat increases, the character of our response to it 
must change. This country has a cherished tradition of separation between its police and 
its military. That tradition has generally delegated responsibility for keeping the 
citizenry safe from internal, domestic dangers to federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies. Likewise, safeguarding that citizenry from external aggression 
has, for the most part, been the obligation of the United States armed forces. But in a 
time where criminal and terrorist activities may merge at our borders, this distinction 
may not be maintainable. New cooperation is mandated between the military and the 
border patrol. In terms of that cooperation, the military must be prepared to assume a 
greater role. 
AN OVER-TAXED BORDER 
No one seems to underestimate the urgency of the requirement. Nor have they since 
before 9/11. 
The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, commonly known 
as the Hart-Rudman Commission, recommended that the executive branch establish a 
“National Homeland Security Agency.” Among other things, this agency would 
encompass the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the United States Coast Guard 
in a synergistic environment to patrol U.S. borders and police the flow of peoples and 
goods through hundreds of ports of entry.2 Legislation creating the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) included border and transportation security as one of the 
original five under-secretariats.  When Secretary Michael Chertoff came to Washington 
in February 2005, he entered the department with “six priorities;” the third of those was 
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to “strengthen border security and interior enforcement…3” The new secretary would 
make his concerns clear as he unveiled a new organizational structure that would 
remove bureaucratic layers between his office and customs and border protection as 
part of an effort to 
…gain full control of our borders to prevent illegal immigration and security 
breaches. Flagrant violation of our borders undercuts respect for the rule of law 
and undermines our security. It also poses a particular burden to those in our 
border communities. We are developing a new approach to controlling the 
border, one that includes an integrated mix of additional staff, new technology 
and enhanced infrastructure investment.4   
Institutionally, the requirement for a robust border security mechanism seemed clear. 
 Functionally, the requirement was even clearer. In the best of times, under the best 
of circumstances, the need for diligence at the border is compelling.   
On a typical day, more than 1.1 million passengers and pedestrians, including 
635,000 aliens, over 235,000 air passengers, over 333,000 privately owned 
vehicles, and over 79,000 shipments of goods are processed at the nation’s 
borders.5 
Every year U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processes nearly half a billion 
people, 130 million trucks and cars, and 20 million cargo containers through 325 ports 
of entry.6   
Curiously enough, however, the immensity of the daily requirement is not the most 
compelling factor among concerns over the security of the border. What is described 
above is the routine, legitimate traffic that allows for the free flow of visitors and 
commerce, keeping open the doors of the “land of opportunity” and, coincidentally, 
sustaining much of the economy. The greater concern for security lies beyond these 
factors in an accompanying flow that does not seek legitimate opportunity, but criminal 
gain; that is not interested in sharing the American way of life, but in undermining it 
and the institutions and values which sustain it. A report developed in the House of 
Representatives’ Committee on Homeland Security offers an interesting and potentially 
ominous contrast: 
During 2005, Border Patrol apprehended approximately 1.2 million illegal aliens 
[along the Southwest border between the United States and Mexico]; of those, 
165,000 were from countries other than Mexico. Of the non-Mexican aliens, 
approximately 650 were from special interest countries. 7, 8 
The threat along the northern border, while far less publicized, is nevertheless cause for 
concern; perhaps equal concern, perhaps greater. In 1988, U.S. Customs officials 
arrested three members of a Syrian terrorist group, linked to al Qaeda in the process of 
entering the U.S. with explosives.9 Members of the terrorist cell that executed the 1993 
attack on the World Trade Center entered the U.S. from Canada, and were planning to 
use Canada as a possible escape route. In December 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested 
crossing into the United States in possession of bomb making materials and plans for 
what became known as the Millennium bomb plot against Los Angeles International 
Airport.10 Ressam would be characterized by the State Department as a textbook 
example of someone who “capitalized on liberal Canadian immigration and asylum 
policies to enjoy safe haven, raise funds, arrange logistical support, and plan terrorist 
attacks.”11   
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And the past, we have every reason to fear, may well be prelude, as pointed out by Dr. 
Todd Hataley of the Royal Military College of Canada: 
In the post 9/11 period Canada has continued to raise security concerns in the 
United States. U.S. security officials believe that Canada is not only home to 
“sleeper cells” waiting for a chance to cross the border and attack the United 
States, but also that crossing from Canada has become a favorite route for illegal 
immigrants, drug smugglers, and potential terrorists.12 
THE MILITARY IN (LIMITED) SUPPORT 
Juxtapose this history against a northern border that stretches nearly 5,000 miles and a 
southwestern counterpart that runs another 2,000, and the challenge weighing against 
CBP is irksome, to say the least. In October 2006 there were 11,000 agents assigned to 
watch and protect both sets of borders.13 In May 2006, the Administration embarked 
upon a plan to raise those numbers to over 18,000 by the end of 2008,14 increasing the 
total number to over 101% of the number that stood when the president took office in 
2001.15  
Whether or not that number will be sufficient is debatable. Whatever the case, plans 
for the future do not meet a requirement facing us today. The challenges that have 
inspired these increases will not be suspended until the increases can be brought about.  
As though acknowledging the same, the Administration launched Operation Jump Start 
in May 2006. The operation was officially terminated on July 15, 2008,16 but at its 
height included over 6,000 National Guard from forty-eight states, brought to 
“strengthen border security and encourage deterrence.”17 David V. Aguilar, chief of the 
Office of Border Patrol for CBP, testified as to the nature of the Guard’s mission before 
members of the House Homeland Security Committee:  
National Guard units will assist DHS by executing missions such as logistical and 
administrative support, operating detection systems, providing mobile 
communications, augmenting DHS’s border-related intelligence analysis efforts, 
building and installing border security infrastructure, providing transportation 
and training.18 
It is important to note, however, that while the presence of the Guard allowed CBP 
agents to return focus to law enforcement activities along the border, the troops did not 
join the agents in those activities, nor were they ever intended to do so. At the same 
hearing, Chief Aguilar was quick to remind the Congress of one clear distinction 
between the National Guard and the CBP mission. 
However, law enforcement along the border between the ports of entry will 
remain the responsibility of Border Patrol agents. The National Guard will play 
no direct law enforcement role in the apprehension, custodial care or security of 
those who are detained.19 
This pronounced distinction in the roles that the National Guard may assume in border 
operations may seem confusing. After all, the immediate requirement that saw the 
deployment of Guard seems to invite additional manpower on the border to assist in 
surveillance, intervention, apprehension, and arrest. In the face of the immensity of 
their task, CBP lauding the fact that 6,000 National Guard allowed the Border Patrol to 
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return 350 agents to “traditional frontline duties”20 could easily lead to questions as to 
why more Guard could not be positioned on those “frontlines.” 
Those slightly schooled in laws and regulations surrounding the issue of military 
support to law enforcement agencies may still be confused. The hub of much of the 
discussion surrounding these issues is the Posse Comitatus Act, legislation enacted in 
the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, which largely prohibits the use of the active 
duty armed forces in executing the domestic laws of the United States.21  Note, however, 
that the act only applies to federal forces. It does not apply to the National Guard, 
unless the Guard forces in question have been “federalized,” or mobilized under Title 10 
of the United States Code to perform a federal mission. Title 10, for instance, is the 
authority under which National Guard units are serving overseas in support of the 
United States’ mission in Iraq. If the Guard forces are either in a “state active duty” 
status, or serving under the authority of Title 32 of the United States Code (a status that 
has the forces sustained by funds from the Department of Defense but retained under 
the command and control of the state governors and their adjutant generals), National 
Guard forces may serve in a direct law enforcement function.22 Why, then, the 
distinction, and restriction, in border operations in the Southwest or any other 
operations of this sort? Perhaps even more to the point: Why restrict the military – 
active or reserve – from directly supporting the law enforcement function of the border 
security mission? 
Soldiers – Not Policemen 
The motivation behind the restriction is, perhaps, uniquely American and embedded in 
our national mindset. Simply stated, the people of the United States do not want our 
soldiers to be policemen, or our policemen to be soldiers. The philosophical 
underpinnings of this aversion can be traced to the colonies of the pre-Revolutionary 
War, when the heretofore loyal subjects of Great Britain were repulsed by oppressive 
measures like the Quartering Acts that cast the British forces in the role of overseers 
and, even, oppressors.23 These same attitudes emerged at the end of the Reconstruction 
following the Civil War, when the federal military stood as an occupying force over the 
former Confederate states. These historic examples – combined, perhaps, with 
persistent images of military oppression that accompanied much of our immigrant 
ancestry from overseas – may help us to understand our citizenry’s aversion to too much 
of a military presence for too long in our streets. Consider, for instance, what may be 
thought of as the subliminal response to the presence of the military in our nation’s 
airports following 9/11.  Initially the sight of soldiers along the concourses of O’Hare and 
Kennedy International kindled an air of assurance and accompanying goodwill. But how 
long was it before some of us were asking “Why are these military people here, with 
those rifles and that equipment?” The truth is Americans live in a state of dichotomy 
regarding attitudes about the military. We appreciate their sacrifice. We acknowledge 
their dedication. We take pride in their prowess and the virtue of their leadership. But 
we are dedicated to the proposition that these soldiers will ever remain the servants of 
the people, and not our overseers. 
Fortunately, few are more sensitive to the military’s role than the military’s 
leadership. The clear distinction between the roles and responsibilities of law 
enforcement and the military is ingrained in the mindset of its generals. Any number of 
reasons could be cited for this sensitivity, beginning with the fact that the country’s all-
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volunteer force is very much a military “of the people” and therefore very much “for the 
people.” Moreover, the senior leadership currently directing our armed forces evolved 
from a generation of young officers born in the shadow of the Vietnam era.24 The 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines of that era undeservedly bore the derisive brunt of 
a society turned sour on the war. In the same time period, reports of the Pentagon 
gathering intelligence against anti-war groups further broadened the divide between 
much of America and her military. Institutional assurances were put in place in the 
1980s to prevent this type of surveillance from ever occurring again;25 but having 
survived that era of distrust between the nation’s people and the nation’s military, the 
current uniformed leadership is keenly aware of how important the support of the 
citizenry is to its soldiers – and how fragile. 
Nothing New in the Requirement? 
Even so, Chief Aguilar reminds us that border security operations involving the National 
Guard are not a requirement unique to the new century: 
Let me first state that National Guard support and coordination with DHS and 
the Border Patrol is nothing new. While this new infusion will be on a larger 
scale, the Border patrol has a history of nearly two decades working with National 
Guard units to utilize their unique expertise, manpower, technology and assets in 
support of our mission and as a force multiplier.26 
In fact, recent history witnessed the United States military’s involvement in border 
security operations not only by the National Guard, but by the active duty component as 
well. In response to a growing connection between border security and counter-
narcotics programs in the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan signed a National Security 
Decision Directive that simultaneously described drug trafficking as a threat to national 
security and authorized military involvement in combating it.27 In 1989, the military’s 
Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) was created to coordinate its expanding support for “the 
anti-drug efforts of border region police agencies, including the Border Patrol.”28 Like 
the Guard, this task force would eventually play an important role in constructing 
physical barriers designed to slow or channel the flow of illegal immigrants. Unlike the 
Guard, JTF-6 also deployed aviation assets and ground troops along the border.29 
Support for the military’s role along the border continued through the 1990s. In 1991, 
key legislation was passed that codified a consensus to allow the Department of Defense 
to support any agency of the federal government with counterdrug responsibilities. 
More noteworthy yet, the legislation opened the way for DoD support to state and local 
government law enforcement agencies in achieving the same ends.30 In 1997, the United 
States House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for the deployment of 
10,000 additional troops in support of counterdrug operations along the southwest 
border.31 
Tragedy was to interrupt the final passage of that resolution. On the evening of May 
20, 1997, eighteen-year-old Ezequiel Hernandez was herding goats when he was 
mistakenly shot by the leader of a Marine rifle team that was observing an area of the 
Rio Grande known for its illegal drug trafficking. The Marines were members of JTF-6 
and had been acting in support of the Border Patrol, but had received no civilian law 
enforcement training or briefings on local conditions.32 
The outcry against the tragic occurrence would eventually subside across most of the 
social landscape, but not from the perspective of the military. Returning to its 
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traditional degree of reticence, the Pentagon’s leadership withdrew its armed forces 
from the border and levied new restrictions that would cast the military in a 
predominantly technical-support capacity. In the future, JTF-6 would be re-designated 
Joint Task Force-North and the personnel-intensive, boots-on-the-ground support 
provided by the unit in the 1990s would be replaced along the border with ground 
sensors, radar, airborne platforms, and thermal imagery. Deliberately postured in 
support of federal, state, and local law enforcement entities, the command’s website 
notes that its technological focus has allowed for a reduction in manpower 
requirements.33 But the first, and perhaps most significant, reduction came in terms of 
troops on the ground. 
This would largely characterize the military’s consistent role, for both the active and 
reserve components (including the National Guard) from the time of the tragedy in 
Texas until the calamity of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of the attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, immediate steps were taken to reinforce the 
security of the nation’s borders. Along entries from both north and south, the president 
commanded the deployment of roughly 1,600 National Guard troops for six months to 
support federal border officials.34 New emphasis in maritime and aviation security 
along, within, and through the approaches to our borders became accompanying 
measures to land border security, and were formalized in interagency strategies.35  
In the midst of these events, the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 
was established on October 1, 2002 “to provide command and control of Department of 
Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil 
authorities.”36 The new combatant command, primarily responsible for active service 
components’ activities within the domestic confines of the United States, was charged in 
their mission statement to:  
Deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its 
territories and interests within its assigned area of responsibility; and as directed 
by the President or the Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil 
authorities, including immediate crisis and subsequent consequence 
management operations.37 
This mission statement instantly distinguished the new command from its counterparts 
overseas. The first part of the mission was reasonably clear, if ominous. “Deter, prevent 
and defeat” could be realistically expected as part and parcel of a military mission 
anywhere around the globe. The armed forces of the United States identify with this 
language and are fully prepared to do whatever is required to fulfill this mission. But the 
second half of the command’s mission statement (euphemistically referred to across the 
military as the “right of the semicolon” requirement) was less intuitive, and arguably 
more complex than the first. The powerful segue – “as directed by the President or the 
Secretary of Defense” – is indicative of a very measured approach to this part of the 
mission.  Placing the military in support of civil authorities will concurrently place them 
in activities normally conducted and controlled by those authorities. And the closer the 
military comes to controlling civil activities, the less comfortable it finds the mission.   
A SHIFT IN FOCUS: COUNTERDRUG TO COUNTERTERROR 
The military’s directives support its reticence. Civil support is characterized by the 
Department of Defense as granted in response to domestic emergencies and “for 
designated law enforcement and other activities.”38 However, the DoD directive 
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regulating military support to civilian law enforcement agencies specifically prohibits 
the use of the military for interdiction; search and seizure; arrest, apprehension, stop 
and frisk or similar activity; and the use of military personnel in the pursuit of 
individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.39   
As the new structure of NORTHCOM was designed to meet the threat, along with a 
new office in the Department of Defense to oversee it,40 the support mission for the 
military along the border was also changing. JTF-6, as previously noted, was re-
designated JTF-North. This change in designation would mirror a change in focus, away 
from counterdrug operations to counterterror operations. Persistent, legitimate 
concerns over drug trafficking were being overshadowed by revelations of looming 
threats to our north and south. In Canada, as early as 1998, the Special Senate 
Committee on Security and Intelligence labeled the country as  
…a ‘venue of opportunity’ for terrorist groups: a place where they may raise 
funds, purchase arms, and conduct other activities to support their organizations 
and their terrorist activities elsewhere. Most of the international terrorist 
organizations have a presence in Canada. Our geographic location also makes 
Canada a favorite conduit for terrorists wishing to enter the United States, which 
remains the principal target for terrorist attacks worldwide.41 
More recently, the same committee reported that “[a] relatively large number of 
terrorist groups [is] known to be operating in Canada, engaged in fundraising, procuring 
materials, spreading propaganda, recruiting followers and conducting other activities.”42 
To the south, there is growing concern over the opportunities being taken to 
transplant elements of international terrorist organizations among our closest 
neighbors. As early as May 2001, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, former Mexican national 
security adviser and ambassador to the United Nations warned that “Spanish and 
Islamic terrorist groups are using Mexico as a refuge.”43 General James T. Hill, former 
commander of U.S. Southern Command, warned that the U.S. faces a growing risk, both 
from terrorist groups relocating to Latin America and “homegrown” groups originating 
therein. He warned specifically that Hezbollah and groups like it had established bases 
in Latin America, taking advantage of nearly ungovernable areas like the tri-border 
region between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.44 Add to these viable concerns over 
Venezuela’s support to radical Islamic groups,45 and the security concerns surrounding 
the well-being of our people at home continue to grow. 
Unfortunately, as the military and the law enforcement agencies it supports along the 
border have moved on to this new concern, they can ill-afford to leave the old concerns 
behind. As though adding to the population of a snake pit, the arrival of terrorist 
concerns has done nothing to thin out the presence of drug traffickers among the 
cartels. Neither has it had an effect in reducing other organized-crime activities, like 
human trafficking, or diminishing a rise in criminal gang activity immigrating through 
Mexico into the United States. A majority report from the House of Representatives 
Committee on Homeland Security gave voice to these concerns, warning against “the 
triple threat of drug smuggling, illegal and unknown crossers, and rising violence” facing 
communities in the southwest.46 
Criminals involved in this activity have taken on an air of arrogance that should 
further spur the nation’s concerns. The aforementioned House study validates frequent 
reports that the cartels may be literally “outgunning” local law enforcement agencies on 
both sides of the border, possessing military-grade weapons, technologies and 
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intelligence, and their own “paramilitary enforcers.47” The enforcers usually restrict 
their activities to actions against rival factions, but not always. In 2005, just hours after 
being sworn in as Nuevo Laredo’s police chief, Alejandro Dominguez was killed.  
Dominguez came to office on the promise of cracking down on the cartels.48   
This threat across the border should be enough to warrant alarm, but there are 
growing concerns that it cannot be contained there. Violence against U.S. law 
enforcement officials, from the Border Patrol to local law enforcement agencies, is rising 
at an alarming rate. From 2004 to 2005, attacks against Border Patrol agents on the 
Southwest border increased 108 percent. During fiscal year 2006 there were 746 violent 
incidents launched against these agents, including rock assaults, physical assaults, 
vehicle assaults, and firearm assaults. In March 2006, the House Judicial Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims conducted a hearing 
addressing these issues, noting a growing concern over law enforcement agents literally 
being “outmanned and outgunned” by criminal elements.49 In January 2008, a U.S. 
Border Patrol agent was run down and killed near the Imperial Sand Dunes in Southern 
California, by men suspected of drug and alien smuggling.50 And in what is perhaps the 
most blatant disregard for our territorial integrity so far, various cartel elements have 
recently initiated open attacks across our borders – against rival cartel members, 
against former Mexican law enforcement officials who have fled to the United States, 
and even against state and federal law enforcement officials.51 
General Barry R. McCaffrey, former director of the White House Office of National 
Drug Control Policy, commented on the disturbing partnership growing between crime 
and terrorism at the nation’s door. 
These groups are drawn together because of their complementary capabilities.  
Terrorists can create chaotic circumstances that allow for illicit activities.  
Criminal organizations have pre-established networks to move and sell narcotics 
and launder money.52 
To date, the manifestations of this partnership have not taken on a character that would 
call for a military response. However, a recent report from Arizona indicates that a 
future requirement for the same is not beyond reason. Officials at Fort Huachuca, the 
nation’s largest intelligence training center, changed security measures in May of last 
year after being warned that Islamist terrorists, with the paid assistance of Mexican 
drug cartels arranging their entry, were planning an attack against the post.53 The 
plotters, up to sixty in number, were reported to be Afghan and Iraqi terrorists with 
high-powered weapons (including anti-tank missiles, Soviet-era surface-to-air missiles, 
and grenade launchers) smuggled into the United States through tunnels. The FBI 
would not elaborate on investigations surrounding the threat; neither would they 
comment on other reports suggesting the “plot” was a Gulf cartel “plant” to bring in the 
U.S. military against a rival cartel. But an FBI representative did acknowledge that the 
report “demonstrates the cross-pollination that frequently exists between criminal and 
terrorist groups.”54 
The immediacy of genuine defense concerns, as opposed to law enforcement concerns 
along the border, is certainly open to question. Nevertheless, the evolving, intersecting 
threats of organized crime and terrorism, masked by the relentless challenge of illegal 
immigration across our borders, clearly present a dangerous and perplexing set of 
difficulties for federal, state, and local government officials. Law enforcement agencies 
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across all three levels of government have the lead in addressing the difficulties. The 
military has been, and continues to be, in support. But is the current role being played 
by the military – under the current circumstances, against the current threat – 
appropriate?   
Temporary, but Recurring? 
As though hedging bets, all discussion of placing the military in support of border 
security operations in the United States is consistently couched in terms of temporary 
requirements. Such was the case in 2002; such was the case again in 2006. It is clear 
that the current Administration is making an honest effort in re-tooling Customs and 
Border Protection, in terms of both technology and “boots-on-the-ground” to meet the 
broader threat that has emerged since 9/11. The functions that have characterized DoD 
support along the border – communications and logistical support, lending and 
operating detection and sensor systems, augmenting border-related intelligence analysis 
efforts, training, and so forth – are being reflected in the strategic plans of the 
Department of Homeland Security in general and its Customs and Border Protection 
agency in particular. CBP’s strategic plan specifically lays out a strategic objective to 
“maximize border security…through an appropriate balance of personnel, equipment, 
technology, communications capability and tactical infrastructure.”55 Moreover, the 
DHS is clearly intent on putting resources behind their rhetoric, as demonstrated by the 
fact that approximately half of its $5.4 billion information technology budget for 2008 
will go towards developing and modernizing these capabilities.56 Ostensibly, the intent 
is to enable CBP to completely take control of that part of the mission the military has 
served to supplement to date. 
The question is, can we reasonably expect them to do that? 
Is it reasonable, for instance, to expect the Department of Homeland Security to 
duplicate the sensor capabilities that have been introduced in their support during this 
“period of transition?” Is it feasible and/or advisable for them to reproduce the 
communication suites that have supported their operations along the southwest border 
since 2006? Is it fiscally responsible to match the engineer assets that the military has 
introduced in support of the mission over the last few decades…and the maintenance 
capability…and the training capacity? To be sure, DHS has the means and the aptitude 
to address all of these functions to a degree; but does it have enough to meet the 
requirement posed by the threat according to our current assessment? And if it does, or 
shall soon, is it fair to assume that DHS will be able to meet the full evolving 
requirement to meet an evolving threat? 
Is it safe to make that assumption?  
PLANNING FOR THE LONGER TERM AGAINST A VARIABLE THREAT 
I would contend that it is not. The Department of Homeland Security’s current direction 
towards strengthening border security will not, and can never, be the final solution. 
Trying to empower a single federal agency with the ability to solve foreseeable 
challenges in this area is neither feasible, nor advisable. Expecting our military forces to 
continue to “stand in the gap” in their present capacity is also ill-advised, whether 
referring to the federal component – our active duty forces – or the “states militia” 
whose strength resides principally in the National Guard. A closer approximation of a 
solution to the evolving dilemma will begin with the realization that the border 
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challenge must be addressed as a problem that varies with the introduction of a variable 












Figure 1. Variable Scale of Border Protection  
 
 
Experience has taught us that the lower end of that threat is embodied in massive 
numbers of illegal aliens, albeit ones without malicious intent (indeed, a significant 
amount of the nation’s concern in this regard is for the well-being of the aliens 
themselves).57 It is reasonable to assign day-to-day cognizance over that end of the 
threat to Customs and Border Protection, as the clear “lead federal agency”.   
As the threat moves further up the scale, however, we are introduced to an organized 
criminal element which has been seen trafficking both drugs and human beings. At this 
point, one might envision a requirement quite literally calling for greater force. That 
force could begin with a concentration and coordination of other law enforcement 
agencies (federal, state, and local). These would be keyed to their requirement by 
integrated information and intelligence from across the federal interagency. But they 
should also be served by mechanisms designed for intergovernmental intelligence and 
information exchange – up and down the chain between federal, state, and local 
authorities.   
That exchange could also provide warnings and signals at the upper end of our threat 
spectrum, manifested in the aforementioned confluence of organized crime and 
international terrorism. In her study “U.S. Border Enforcement: From Horseback to 
High-Tech,” Deborah Waller Meyers suggests that the difference in responding to the 
variations of the threat at our borders may parallel the difference between border 
control (protection against the illegal entry of people and goods), border safety 
(protection against criminals, violence, smuggling, etc.), and border security (protection 
against terrorists).58 
Responsibility for security at the border, therefore, becomes a shared concern.  
Federal, state, and local government must arrive at a common understanding of what is 
needed to provide an acceptable level of security at the borders, and then determine a 
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package to provide that security that is feasible, affordable, and acceptable to the 
American people. Addressing our variable scale, therefore, begins in the federal 
government with an interagency plan, led by the Department of Homeland Security.  
The impetus for border protection that began with consolidating the nation’s frontline 
border enforcement agencies under Customs and Border Protection must be continued 
to harness the support of other agencies (including but not limited to DoD) that have 
vital roles in meeting the complexities of the task. This will certainly include agencies 
like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
whose traditional roles along both borders provide a background in both information 
and intelligence exchange and law enforcement. Multiple sectors of the intelligence 
community, led by DHS’ own under secretariat for intelligence and analysis, can provide 
for the underpinnings of what the Department of Defense calls an “active, layered 
defense.”59  In turn, they will provide for the security of our borders, ideally well before 
the threat reaches it.  
A stand-alone federal solution, however, will be one doomed to failure. Governor 
Janet Napolitano of Arizona begrudgingly acknowledged as much when she declared: 
States are not responsible for operational control of international borders; 
however, due to the dire situation that exists along the United States-Mexico 
border in Arizona, the state has had to act to preserve the rights and bests 
interests of its citizens.60 
Concerns mirroring those of Governor Napolitano, in Texas, New Mexico, and 
California, led to the memorandum of understanding signed between those states and 
the Department of Defense that served as the foundation for Operation Jump Start.  
Comparable shared concerns between the states of New York, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, and the federal government led to similar agreements in the initiation and 
execution of Operation Winter Freeze in 2004.61 
Beyond these operations, a host of evolving mechanisms are being built to strengthen 
cooperative efforts between the three levels of government that could be trained to 
address concerns for border security. The FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force offices 
located across the country (notably including cells in Phoenix, San Diego, and El Paso) 
could certainly be utilized towards these ends, bringing together representatives not 
only from state and local law enforcement, but agencies like the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard, and DoD.  Likewise, 
state fusion centers, financially sponsored in their development through grants from the 
Department of Homeland Security, are already serving as principal conduits for 
information exchange.  
The military’s role in the solution set that will be required in this combined 
interagency and intergovernmental solution, while occasionally cumbersome for the 
services, is inescapable.  The expected transition described by the Bush Administration 
as the impetus behind Operation Jump Start may begin to solve the immediate problem 
at the lower end of the variable scale, but it should not be relied upon to address the 
middle and upper dimensions of its concerns. Even assuming CBP receives a significant 
infusion of resources to provide for technological solutions, that infusion will not take 
place overnight. While Operation Jump Start was officially terminated, counterdrug 
operation support is still being provided by our armed forces, Innovative Readiness 
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Training (IRT) from the National Guard remains on the borders,62 and sensor support 
operations from elements of both the active and reserve component remain underway.63  
The equipment and expertise currently being provided by the military will, for at least 
the time being, remain a requirement.   
Moreover, technology can only serve to complement boots-on-the-border; it cannot 
replace them.  Whether focused on interdicting the threat or – more ideally – deterring 
or preventing illegal transit, it is the physical presence of people that will actually 
accomplish the desired function. Again, DHS recognizes this reality and, along with the 
infusion of funds provided for technology along the border, is asking for an increase of 
$442.4 million to hire, train, and equip 2,200 new Border Patrol agents.64 But these 
planned increases will not translate into immediate reinforcement along the borders.  
And, when spread across more than 7,000 miles of border to our north and south, 2,200 
new agents may still project a degree of protection that is exceedingly thin. Therefore – 
even if only addressing the steady-state, lower-end requirement suggested by our 
variable scale – sufficient numbers for accomplishing this mission may only be available 
if the military remains actively engaged.    
Keeping the military engaged and, as necessary, bolstering that engagement, will 
present a series of questions. First, the nation’s leadership must decide which 
component of the military is best suited to address the issue along our variable scale: the 
active duty forces, or the National Guard, or both? Next, it will have to address the 
relative capacity of those forces to take on these responsibilities. Finally, having 
addressed the feasibility of the requirement, the leadership will have to return to the 
question of whether such engagement is advisable and, most importantly, acceptable in 
the eyes of the American people. 
Active Duty Forces  
Recent tradition shows that if an active component organization is involved in domestic 
civil support operations, its role is specialized and its numbers are small. A good 
example is the United States Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response 
Force (CBIRF). The CBIRF’s mission requires it to respond to credible threats of a 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high explosive yield incident in order to 
assist local, state, or federal agencies.65 The unit lists an impressive array of capabilities 
to include agent detection and identification, casualty search and rescue, personnel 
decontamination, medical care, and stabilization of contaminated personnel.66  
However, the unit is composed of only 350 personnel and its mission is focused, and 
contained, around CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High 
Explosive Yield) incident response. The United States Northern Command’s Joint Task 
Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) was also designed as a very specialized force, dedicated 
to planning and integrating consequence management support from the Department of 
Defense to civil authorities following a CBRNE incident. However, the task force is 
essentially a command and control entity, without assigned forces or dedicated 
transportation. In the event of a CBRNE crisis, several thousand personnel could be 
attached to JTF-CS by order of the secretary of defense to handle manpower intensive 
requirements alongside the specialized requirements the unit is uniquely qualified to 
fulfill.67 
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 Joint Task Force North, as already noted, is much more directed to matters 
associated with the concerns of this article. The mission statement of the organization 
reiterates its relevance here. 
As directed, Joint Task Force North employs military capabilities to support law 
enforcement agencies and supports interagency synchronization within the 
United States Northern Command area of responsibility in order to deter and 
prevent transnational threats to the homeland.68 
As is the case with much of the current National Guard mission along the southwest 
border, JTF-N has frequently assisted law enforcement efforts by means of detection 
and monitoring missions and by facilitating engineer support. This facilitation is 
brought about by the unit processing and prioritizing requests, and then sourcing those 
requests through appropriate active duty units.69 In addition to these roles, however, the 
task force has played an important part in providing intelligence analysis and 
information sharing with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; other 
federal interagency partners; military units in support (from the active component, the 
service’s reserves, and the National Guard); and (when authorized and appropriate) 
Canadian, Mexican, and other international partners by way of bi-national 
agreements.70 Beyond this support, the task force has a history of conducting 
collaborative planning with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. This 
ability to plan for complex operations, incorporating bi-national, federal, state, and local 
stakeholders, highlights a core competency of the military and continues to prove more 
than beneficial in civil support missions inside and out of the United States. 
Placed reasonably along the variable scale, the role of JTF-N could be seen in support 
of the Border Patrol in interdicting and arresting criminal elements, and intercepting 
and/or deterring the flow of terrorists over the nation’s borders. While very deliberately 
not involved in arrest and apprehension themselves, the task force can support CBP as 
the primary law enforcement agency charged with that responsibility. Truthfully, if 
statutes and regulations were amended to allow JTF-N to join in those more direct 
functions, they are hardly configured to do so. Possessing approximately 150 soldiers, 
the unit’s main contribution is in intelligence and information sharing, and in 
facilitating the introduction of other military forces to accomplish specified ends. 
Perhaps curiously, JTF-N may be the only standing force from the military’s active 
component dedicated to an aspect of land border security. Its ties to the mission are 
indirect, born out of a concern over the illicit flow of drugs across our borders; but the 
evolution of those counterdrug concerns to the newer concerns over counterterrorism 
will no doubt assure the task force’s continued association with the CBP and its partner 
agencies.   
In the meantime, there are other units whose missions could be applied to these 
endeavors, especially as concerns progress from border control, to border safety, to 
border security. The United States Northern Command itself may serve a vital liaison 
function between the militaries of the United States, Canada, and Mexico, ensuring 
transparency and encouraging cooperation through bilateral and multilateral Theater 
Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs). NORTHCOM’s Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters-North (SJFHQ-N) is poised as a deployable command and control 
element about which a Joint Task Force could be quickly configured in response to any 
number of homeland defense scenarios71 – to include scenarios along our borders. Pre-
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designated Quick Response Forces in both the United States Army and the United States 
Marine Corps could rapidly fall in as the key components of those JTFs, if deployed. But 
they are not, nor are they envisioned to be, dedicated forces for those missions. 
The National Guard 
Then again, neither is the National Guard. Operation Jump Start, like the 2002 mission 
conducted in the wake of 9/11, was framed by the Administration as being an anomaly.  
Unless an unexpected turn of events lifts the threat from our borders, however, or a 
remarkable (some would suggest inadvisable) infusion of manpower takes place in the 
Border Patrol, it is likely to be a recurring anomaly. In spite of understandable reticence 
surrounding their use, no force recommends itself better to the mission than the Guard. 
The thing that recommends the Guard most as the military resource of choice in 
support to civil authorities is its traditional relationship with those authorities. 
Recruiting offices across the country remind us of this relationship, an affinity born of 
both empathy and the proximity of the Guard to the people they serve. No one in the 
military is more attuned to the border enforcement, safety, and security challenges 
facing Yuma County, Arizona than the Arizona National Guard; no one in the armed 
forces is more aware of persistent concerns surrounding aliens of interest passing 
through the Swanton sector of New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York than their 
Guard. Likewise, no element of the United States military enjoys a closer working 
relationship with state and local government than those who dwell among them, 
exercise with them, and plan to respond to emergencies alongside them – in the 
National Guard.   
Accordingly, logic continues to dictate that if greater forces are needed along the 
border, the Guard is the “go to” solution. The same thought process that calls for closer 
integration between federal, state, and local law enforcement extends easily to 
incorporating the local “state militia” in support of those integrated efforts. By further 
extension, as regional state cooperative efforts like the ones discussed here continue, 
cooperative, collaborative planning between the adjoining states’ National Guard will 
provide a synergy that could “close the seams” between states’ borders while 
simultaneously addressing the larger national border issue.   
While the greatest urgency surrounding border security may exist in the states that 
constitute those borders, the cost for providing that security should not be theirs to bear 
alone. In fact, there are a number of precedents that have been set since 9/11 which 
allow for greater federal support to the states’ immediate concerns. Notable among 
these are measures designed to fund deployment and employment of the National 
Guard in missions which remain under state control. For instance, Title 32 of the United 
States Code has been invoked by the secretary of defense in providing funds for state 
missions that remain under the authority of that state’s governor as “necessary and 
appropriate” in supporting “homeland defense” activities.72 Similarly, the potential 
exists for states’ governors to fund National Guard activities undertaken in state active 
duty status through Department of Homeland Security grant monies.73 Additionally, 
federal funding available to the states via 32 U.S.C. §112 for “drug interdiction and 
counterdrug activities” could logically be extended to a state force whose mission is tied 
to the federal effort to interdict these illicit activities coincident with the general policing 
of the nation’s borders.74  
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Funding issues, however, become secondary when viewed against the greater concern 
of how the National Guard could afford the additional manpower demands implied in a 
recurring border security mission. A partial solution to this more immediate challenge 
to border states is to continue to augment their efforts with National Guard units from 
other states. Doing so would continue the pattern begun in 2002, revisited in Operation 
Winter Freeze, and most recently exhibited in Operation Jump Start.  Officials are quick 
to point out that military readiness was not degraded by the Guard’s participation in 
these endeavors.75 Rather, the Guard’s support has been portrayed as enhancing the 
engaged units’ readiness in engineering, logistics, transportation, aviation, medical, and 
maintenance. Given continued federal funding, and accompanying cooperation among 
the states through the EMAC, this is a mechanism that could be applied to the problem 
for some time.  
One should understand, however, that this is only a partial solution, and one that 
may not be sustainable. Indeed, rising demands, set against existing numbers in the 
Guard, may make sustainability the ultimate “deal breaker” in these discussions. The 
current strain being felt by the National Guard due to its employment at home and 
abroad is well documented. Expecting the Guard to accept an increased burden by way 
of operations along the border amounts to what has been called “a further strain on 
already overextended military resources.”76 What most people fail to realize is that the 
National Guard has taken on these unprecedented demands, escalating from 
deployments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the late 1990s and on through 
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, with historically weakened 
manpower rolls. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Guard was charged with 
making force reductions that have never been recovered. In 1989, the end strength of 
the National Guard stood at 570,000 personnel. Buoyed by the confidence of a “peace 
dividend” yet to be realized, that force has now been reduced by 20 percent to numbers 
that today stand at approximately 456,000, of which 350,000 are Army Guard.77 
Balance this depletion against the comparative operational tempo of the National Guard 
in the last three decades, and the picture becomes bleaker still. In the 1980s, serving 
Guard accounted for approximately 1 million man-days of duty per year. In the 1990s, 
(with a shrinking force), that figure had grown to 12.5 million man-days. In 2003, 
statistics showed that these figures had ballooned to 63 million man-days per year.78 
It is beyond the intent of this article to suggest how many personnel are required to 
effectively secure the borders of the United States. In 2005, the late Representative 
Charlie Norwood (R-GA) sponsored a study that suggested 36,000 National Guard 
and/or authorized “State Defense Forces” would be required to assist the Border Patrol 
in securing the southwest border of the United States.79 At one point before the 
activation of Operation Jump Start, the Administration had planned to deploy 10-
12,000 troops in support of the border patrol, as opposed to the 6,000 that were 
eventually sent.80 Whatever the case, the numbers and the need that inspire them are 
more than appreciable. Combine concerns for the southwest border with the realization 
that our border with Canada is twice its size – and that there are only one-tenth the 
number of border patrol agents there as exist in the southwest to “protect” it – and the 
immensity of the requirement at hand becomes more appreciable still.   
But up until this point we have only examined numbers, without coming to grips with 
how those numbers should be applied. It should be obvious that the 36,000-man 
augmentation envisioned in Congressman Norwood’s study were not intended merely 
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for surveillance, intelligence analysis, or engineering functions. They were intended to 
be postured as the deterrent effect that can only be supplied by boots-on-the-ground, 
standing in the gap, able to interdict and, as necessary, arrest and apprehend the threat 
to our people. They were intended to augment law enforcement agents alongside of 
those agents, occasionally providing peripheral support to their mission, but equally 
prepared to provide direct support to policing requirements. Were the threats we are 
facing still limited to those unintentionally accompanying the “huddled masses yearning 
to breath free,” the necessity for this augmentation would be significantly different.  But 
that is not the case and the nation is obliged to prepare for a greater menace. 
We are faced in the center and upper levels of our variable scale with a requirement 
that fails to fit comfortably in the realm of either law enforcement or national defense.  
Given the adversaries encountered in what has been called the “seam of ambiguity” 
between the two, the best path is to prepare to meet the trials of both environments.  
With all deference to the Department of Homeland Security and especially to their 
Border Patrol agents, it is illogical to expect them to be prepared for an upper-end threat 
that may see them outgunned. Neither is it logical to expect the American public to 
duplicate the assets and capabilities contained in the military to perform a function it 
should be capable of fulfilling. The reticence the armed forces have demonstrated in 
taking on the more direct involvement envisioned here is understandable – but perhaps 
misguided. Beyond the question of technology and manpower, of capabilities and 
numbers, the military requires a new mindset in addressing the border security issue. 
The spirit embedded in the Posse Comitatus Act, and the laws and regulations which 
reflect it, is focused on reiterating and retaining the role of the military of the United 
States as the servant of its people. But the preponderance of the concern along our 
borders does not have to do with the comings and goings of the American people. Our 
concern is over the illegal entry into our country of those who wish to do us harm. The 
nation’s primary defensive focus, as always, remains outward against an external threat 
– but that focus must now begin on the nation’s shorelines and along its territorial 
boundaries. The studied hesitancy of leadership in the Department of Defense should be 
viewed against how quickly border enforcement issues could become border safety 
issues and, finally, reactive issues of national defense. An organization that justifiably 
prides itself on a preemptive mentality should bear no umbrage against employing itself 
as an obstacle to the threats envisioned here. 
There is no doubt that these measures will require a reexamination of statutes, 
policies, and directives. But 9/11 has forced many such reexaminations. Moreover, the 
redirection envisioned here need not automatically alter the traditional relationship 
between America and its military concerning matters of domestic law enforcement. It 
will, however, automatically and exponentially emphasize a message of deterrence along 
our borders and bolster the means of defending those borders should deterrence fail. 
CONCLUSION 
Border security isn’t what it used to be. Over the last three decades our concerns have 
steadily escalated from what was once as much a humanitarian issue as a security issue, 
to concerns over paramilitary violence, organized crime, and international terrorism. 
The requirements to meet these concerns have likewise increased, to the point that 
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anything less than an interagency and intergovernmental response will inevitably leave 
the nation’s citizenry vulnerable to a new and expanding series of threats.   
One would like to think that the new era of threats to the country’s borders and its 
people is a temporary condition and that the nation could soon settle back to a less 
demanding posture of readiness. Unfortunately, reality does not accommodate those 
wishes. The “long war” our leadership forecasts for the nation and our allies cannot be 
expected to remain “over there.” Mr. Craig Duehring, principal deputy assistant 
secretary of defense for reserve affairs, framed the current state of affairs succinctly and 
with candor: 
The nature of the mission has changed because of the Global War on Terrorism.  
The potential danger to our country has increased dramatically. It’s not just a 
story of people looking for a better way of life. It is, in fact, a great potential for 
increased damage to our country, threats to our citizens, to our way of life. That’s 
something that needs to be addressed. We took the border mission for granted 
for too many years, and that’s no longer going to be the case.81 
The new threat portends a new challenge for the military, both active and reserve 
components, from the United States Northern Command through to the individual 
states’ National Guard. It will compel the military to revisit its thinking, motivation, and 
ethos in addressing this particular “law enforcement” requirement. The National Guard 
is by far the best tool to apply to the problem, but to do so must itself be re-tooled – 
principally in terms of numbers, but likewise in its predilection to take on a mission that 
normally resides outside of its traditional “lane.” This should not imply, however, that 
the Guard should be the only military component focused on the problem. As the issue 
of security along the nation’s borders climbs to concerns over protection against 
terrorism, assets and components of the active duty force, under the direction of the 
NORTHCOM, must be folded into the process – first in terms of planning, and then, as 
necessary, in execution of those plans alongside their counterparts in the Guard. This 
coordination in planning and execution will be essential, as the National Guard will 
provide the foundation from which to launch a graduated response, if and when 
required.  
Inevitably, a national strategy, emanating from the same impetus that launched 
Homeland Security Presidential Directives on maritime and aviation security82 will be 
required for the land component of the nation’s border protection. Reason and tradition 
dictate that the Department of Homeland Security take the lead on the development of 
this strategy, with the Department of Defense heavily in support. When DoD’s 
supporting role is portrayed, it should be as a reflection of an operational concept drawn 
up in cooperation and coordination between NORTHCOM and the National Guard 
Bureau. This strategy will require our government to decide from the depth and breadth 
of its capabilities which entities are best postured, best equipped, and best trained to 
meet the trials that lay ahead. Once those means are selected, however, they must come 
with an accompanying commitment from our government to ensure that they are 
sustainable. That sustainability must be measured in terms of equipment, in terms of 
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